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This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in eco-
nomics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent
aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where the aggregation procedure sat-
ises some simple properties. We propose a method for characterizing the extent of
irrationality in a choice behavior, and use this measure to provide a lower bound on
the set of choice behaviors that can be rationalized with n utility functions. Under an
additional assumption (scale-invariance), we show that generically at most ve \rea-
sons" are needed for every \mistake."
JEL Codes: D11, D13, D71
Keywords: Multi-self models, index of irrationality, IIA violations, rationalizability
First version: April 2008. Previous versions of this paper were distributed under the title \Revealed
Conicting Preferences." We are especially grateful to Ben Polak and Larry Samuelson, as well as to
Georoy de Clippel, Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, John Geanakoplos, Dino Gerardi, Tzachi Gilboa, Jerry
Green, Daniel Hojman, Gil Kalai, Bart Lipman, Philippe Mongin, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Ariel Rubinstein,
Rani Spiegler, and Tomasz Strzalecki for their helpful suggestions. We thank seminar audiences at Brown,
Harvard, MIT, Montreal, NYU, UCL, Yale and the North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric
Society for insightful comments.
yAddress: Dept. of Economics, Duke University, 419 Chapel Drive, Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708.
E-mail: aa231@duke.edu.
zAddress: Dept. of Economics and the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, 30 Hillhouse Ave.,
New Haven, CT 06511. E-mail: kareen.rozen@yale.edu. Home page: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~kr287/.1 Introduction
Suppose you see a group or individual decision-maker exhibiting choice behavior which is
inconsistent with standard utility maximization. It is presumed that this choice behavior
arises from the aggregation of multiple utility functions (e.g., corresponding to dierent in-
dividuals, selves, or rationales) using some given method of aggregation. How many utility
functions would be sucient to explain this behavior? Conversely, given a method of ag-
gregation, can one identify choice behaviors that are explainable with a certain number of
utility functions? This paper studies these questions within a framework of utility aggrega-
tion. Consider the following examples of aggregation methods (included in this framework),
where U is a collection of utility functions over a space of alternatives X.
Example 1 - Utilitarianism. The aggregate utility of an alternative a in a choice set A
is given by
P
u2U u(a). Note that the utility of an alternative is independent of the choice
set within which it is evaluated.
Example 2 - Generalization of Tversky (1969). The aggregate utility of an alternative a
in a choice set A is
P
u2U (maxb2A u(b) minb2A u(b))u(a), where the contribution of u(a) to
the aggregate utility depends via  on the range of u over choice set A. For binary choice sets,
this reduces to the additive dierence model of Tversky (1969), which was proposed to explain
intransitive pairwise choice through the aggregation of criterion-by-criterion comparisons of
alternatives. For larger choice sets, and when  is the identity, this is the focus-weighted
model of K} oszegi and Szeidl (2012).
Example 3 - Costly self-control. Suppose a decision-maker's long-run self can exert
costly self-control over multiple short-run selves, where the cost of such self-control depends
on how tempting the alternatives are. The aggregate utility of an alternative a in a choice set




usr(a0)   usr(a)] , where ulr and the usr's correspond to
the long-run self and the short run selves, respectively, and ;  are self-control parameters.
If there is only one short-run self, this model is the reduced-form version of Fudenberg and
Levine (2006)'s dual-self impulse control model.
Only rational choice can be explained by Example 1, regardless of the number of utility
functions being aggregated. Examples 2 and 3, however, belong to a literature on multi-self
or multi-utility decision-making which has surged in response to evidence against rational
choice behavior. Proposed models include May (1954), Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002),
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Green and Hojman (2009), and
1K} oszegi and Szeidl (2012) in economics, where selves are often seen as rationales or manifes-
tations of temptation and self control processes; Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) and
Orhun (2009) in marketing, where selves are dierent criteria for evaluating products; and
Tversky (1969), Shar, Simonson and Tversky (1993) and Tversky and Simonson (1993)
in psychology, where selves are dierent motivational systems. A rst feature of these pa-
pers is that they explain \irrational" choice behavior as arising from the aggregation of
multiple objectives.1 This accords with the view in psychology that \the singular self is
a hypothetical construct, an umbrella under which experiences are organized along various
dimensions" (Lachmann 1996). A second important feature is that, like in Examples 2 and
3, the contribution of a given self to aggregate utility may depend on the choice set; this
is related to the idea in psychology that the self \is uid in that it shifts in dierent con-
texts" (Lachmann 1996). As seen from Example 1, both features may be needed to explain
irrational choice behavior.
The present paper studies a framework of utility aggregation that encompasses many
multi-self models in the literature, including Examples 1-3. An aggregator, or model of
aggregation, acts on a collection of utility functions (selves, rationales, or members of a group)
to assign an aggregate utility to each alternative in each choice set. The decision-maker has
a model of aggregation and a collection of utility functions which he uses to select, from each
choice set, the alternative which maximizes aggregate utility. The class of aggregation models
studied here has several basic features exemplied by Examples 1-3. First, the aggregate
utility of an alternative may depend on the choice set only through the set of utility levels
potentially attained by the dierent selves. Second, if two collections of utility functions
each assign higher aggregate utility to one alternative than another alternative, then the
aggregate utility under the combined collection of utility functions preserves that ranking.
Third, we study aggregators possessing some weak continuity properties ensuring that (1)
the cardinality or \intensity" of a self's preference may aect choice and (2) aggregation is
non-dictatorial.2
1An expanded shortlist of the multiple-selves or multiple-utility literature includes Benabou and Pycia
(2002), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Evren and Ok (2007), and Chatterjee and Krishna (forthcoming). This
literature is also related to the application of social choice tools in multi-criteria decision problems, as
in Arrow and Raynaud (1986), and is related more generally to the theory of multiattribute utility (see
Keeney and Raia (1993)). Another approach, developed in Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Salant and
Rubinstein (2008), allows for context-dependence by considering extended choice situations where behavior
can depend on unspecied ancillary conditions or frames. While information eects can explain some context
dependence (Sen (1993), Kochov (2007), Kamenica (2008)), they cannot explain many systematic violations
of IIA (Tversky and Simonson (1993)).
2Using cardinal information in the utility functions is a common feature of models of household and
2In this paper, choice behavior is captured by a choice function. We say that a choice
function is rationalized by a model of aggregation and a collection of utility functions if
the choice from each set is the unique maximizer of aggregate utility. We show that to
answer the question of how many utility functions would be sucient to rationalize a choice
function under a given model of aggregation, one may simply multiply two numbers. The
rst one is the choice function's index of irrationality, as given by our proposed accounting
procedure for violations of IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives). The second one is
a number inherent to the method of aggregation itself, called the proportionality constant
of the aggregator. The proportionality constant, which is independent of both the choice
function and alternative space in question, is found by examining the aggregator's behavior
over an arbitrary three-element set. For utilitarianism, the proportionality constant is in-
nite (irrational behavior cannot be explained); for Examples 2 and 3, as well as a class of
scale-invariant aggregation models, we show that the proportionality constant is uniformly
bounded by ve (at most ve reasons are needed to justify each mistake); for another class of
aggregation models having a \populist" avor, we show that the proportionality constant is
one (at most one reason is needed to justify each mistake). Given any model in our class, our
results thus identify a lower bound on the set of choice functions that can be rationalized
with a xed number of utility functions. Our results thus identify models for which it is
important to impose a priori restrictions on the number of selves (such as positing a \dual
self" model) or the number of attributes of a good which are under consideration | else
the theory may not have any testable implications. This need not be the case outside the
class of models studied here: for example, the models ofManzini and Mariotti (2007) and
de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) can explain only certain types of irrational behaviors even when
using arbitrarily many rationales.
In the models treated by this paper, it can happen that the choice is not the most
preferred alternative according to any of the utility functions, but is the best compromise,
in the sense that it maximizes aggregate utility. Because of this feature, it may be dicult
to tell a priori whether it is possible to construct a rationalization of a choice function.
A corollary of our results is a universal procedure for constructing a rationalization (of any
choice function), using any method of aggregation having a nite constant of proportionality.
intrapersonal decision-making, where the intensities of preferences should be comparable and may play an
important role. Without cardinal information, it would be hard, for example, to model a home-buyer who
believes neighborhood safety is more important than proximity to work, but would be willing to trade a
small enough degree of safety for a shorter commute.
31.1 Related literature
A dierent concept of rationalization in studied by Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002),
who connect the complexity of a rationalization | which they measure by the number of
selves | to the size of the space of alternatives (as opposed to the number of IIA violations).
They say that a collection of strict preference relations rationalizes a choice function if the
choice from each set is optimal for at least one of the preference relations. In this view, each
(ordinal) self serves as a dictator for some subset of choices. They nd that to explain a choice
function dened on an alternative space with n elements, it suces to posit n dierent selves.
An ordinal and dictatorial model as above would not satisfy the properties of the models
studied here. However, one may reinterpret the Kalai et al. (2002) framework as a model of
aggregation using this paper's denition of rationalization, where each utility function in the
model is assigned some choice sets over which it is the sole contributor to aggregate utility
(i.e., dictator). Under that interpretation, to rationalize a particular choice function, one
would have to assign to each utility function the sets over which it acts as dictator, which
amounts to modifying the method of aggregation itself. By contrast, this paper is interested
in studying the set of behaviors rationalizable by a xed aggregator.3 Because the aggregator
is xed, and utility functions may have some contribution to aggregate utility for every choice
set (through a potentially complex functional form), constructing a rationalization for models
within our framework is a more complicated matter than in Kalai et al. (2002). In contrast to
their main result, for any given model of aggregation, our universal method for constructing a
rationalization uses the same number of selves for any choice function which has n violations
of IIA according to our index { independently of the size of the space of alternatives.
Our results complement those in the household choice literature, such as Browning and
Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006). That literature diers in several ways
from the present setting. In view of evidence that household demand cannot arise from the
maximization of a single utility, they examine microeconomic implications of Pareto-ecient
choice, where each member of the household is a utility maximizer. Given a household de-
mand function over m goods (which may be viewed as an incomplete choice function), they
ask when there exist n utility functions fuign
i=1 and a continuously dierentiable function 
of prices and income such that the demand arises from the weighted utilitarian maximization
of
P
u2U (price,income)u() given the budget set (i.e., weights and preferences vary indepen-
dently). Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that if there are n goods, then any demand
3Under another interpretation, they would never have to modify the model of aggregation if it always
required as many selves as there are choice sets. But then the number of selves is xed at 2n   n   1.
4data can be explained by an (n 1)-person household. Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) show
that to explain a given demand function using n people, it is necessary and sucient that the
rank of a certain matrix in a pseudo-Slutsky matrix decomposition be n 1, though without
further restrictions there can be a continuum of explanatory n-person models. While the
above papers assume that the modeler does not know the household's weighting rule, the
current paper addresses the question of rationalization with a xed aggregator. Moreover,
the weight a utility function receives in the present framework depends on utility levels but
not directly on price or income; hence weights and preferences cannot vary independently in
our framework.
There are several recent contributions to the literature on multi-self decision-making
which mostly focus on a dierent set of questions. Of these, most related is Green and
Hojman (2009), who also study a class of aggregation methods. Because they model a DM
as a probability distribution over all possible ordinal preference rankings, their framework
is dicult to compare to models of multi-self decision-making with a discrete number of
cardinal selves, but is related to models in the voting literature (e.g., Saari 1999). Extending
results from that literature, they show that if choice is determined by a voting rule satisfying
a monotonicity property, then their model can explain any choice behavior.4 The rest of their
paper focuses on welfare analysis. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Chambers and Hayashi
(2008) also focus on welfare analysis given choices contradicting rational decision-making.
Other related work includes Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2007)
and Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni (2010), who consider sequential application of
multiple rationales to eliminate alternatives, a process they show can rationalize certain
choice functions.
1.2 Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we formalize the basic framework of utility aggregation, the class of models
studied here, and our concept of rationalization. In Section 3 we describe our index of
irrationality. We begin by introducing our results in Section 4 for the special class of scale
invariant models of aggregation. Our rationalizability result, as well as a sketch of proof
describing our general procedure for constructing rationalizations, are given in Section 5.
We present several extensions in Section 6. An extension of our notation for the basic
4This paper's result on rationalization is independent of their monotonicity theorem.
5framework and results to include type-dependent aggregation is presented in Supplementary
Appendix A.
2 Framework
An individual's (or group's) choice behavior is observed with respect to a nite space of
alternatives X. Let P(X) be the set of nonempty subsets of X. The individual's choice
function c : P(X) ! X identies the alternative c(A) 2 A chosen from each A 2 P(X). A
rationalization of a choice function consists of two components, a collection of utility functions
U and an aggregator f that combines these utilities into an aggregate utility function, in a way
that possibly depends on the choice set. Viewed as a multi-self model, these utility functions
represent a decision-maker's conicting motivations or priorities. The aggregator corresponds
to the method of sorting out dierent priorities to come to a decision. To simplify notation,
in the main text we restrict attention to a simplied framework in which the aggregator
treats all utility functions symmetrically. However, in Supplementary Appendix A we allow
nonanonymous aggregation and extend the main results to asymmetric aggregators which
treat utility functions dierently based on a \type." That feature arises in some models
of multi-self decision-making, such as with long and short-run types of selves (for instance,
consider Example 3). The extension to types requires more cumbersome notation but no
conceptual innovation.
Formally, given the space of alternatives X, a utility function u : X ! R describes the
utility level allocated to each alternative x 2 X.5 A collection of utility functions U is an
unordered list of utility functions. By denition of an unordered list, a collection U can
have multiple identical utility functions, and there is no order hierarchy over members of
the list. Formally, for a given grand set of alternatives X, a collection U is an element of
U(X) = [1
n=1Un(X), where Un(X) is the set of all unordered lists of length n of utility
functions over X. The number of utility functions in U is denoted by jUj, or simply n when
no confusion would arise.
5Though aggregation in this framework is cardinal, the model has the \ordinal" feature that there can
be many \equivalent" representations of an aggregator in this context. In particular, if f rationalizes the
choice function c using the collection U, then so does any increasing transformation of f. Similarly, if f
rationalizes c using the collection U, then f h 1 rationalizes c using the collection hU, where h : R ! R is
invertible on the appropriate domain. That is, given any representation U and f, one can obtain an equivalent
representation by applying a monotone transformation of utilities in U, if a corresponding transformation is
applied to the aggregation function f as well.
6An aggregator f species an aggregate utility for every alternative a in every choice
set A, given a (nite) grand set of alternatives X and any collection U dened over these
alternatives.6 Formally, the domain over which the aggregator f is dened is
fa;A;X;UjX 2 X;U 2 U(X);A 2 P(X);a 2 Ag;
where X is the set of conceivable nite spaces of alternatives. To simplify notation, we
will write f(a;A;U) whenever doing so would not cause confusion. Since the choice set A
is one of the arguments of the function, f aggregates the utilities in the collection U in a
possibly context-dependent way. An aggregation rule may be seen as a particular theory
of how members of the collection are activated by choice sets: the aggregator determines
the weight each utility function receives on the choice set as a function of its utility levels
over the alternatives. We say that a model of aggregation f rationalizes a choice function if
there is a collection of utility functions such that for every choice set, the alternative that
maximizes aggregate utility is the one selected by the choice function.7
Denition 1. A choice function c : P(X) ! X is rationalized by an aggregator f if there
is a collection U such that for every choice set A 2 P(X), c(A) is the unique maximizer of
f(a;A;U) within A.
In this paper, we study a class of aggregators that contains many multi-self models
proposed in the literature { those which are monotonic transformations of an additively
separable form, in which the weight each utility function receives depends on the set of







where h is an increasing transformation, and where g { which evaluates each alternative a 2 A
based on the set of utility values u takes on A { satises the following two properties. First,
g satises consistency: g(a;fu(a0)ga02A)  g(b;fu(a0)ga02A) whenever u(a)  u(b). This is
a minimal consistency requirement, ensuring that g preserves the ranking of u. Second, g
satises neutrality: g(a;fu(a0)ga02A) = g(a;fu(a0)ga02A) for any permutation  : X !
6We could permit aggregators with restricted domains: for convex ^ RX  RX, let Un = n
i=1^ RX.
7The underlying model f encodes additional information, such as the ranking of unchosen alternatives in
each set, that might be observable using a larger data set than that provided by a choice function. However,
using only simple revealed preference on the choice from a menu, only the best choice from each set (i.e.,
the choice function) is elicited in light of the potential menu-dependence of choices.
7X. This says the treatment of alternatives depends on utilities, not names. As described in
the Appendix, models in the class F satisfy six axiomatic properties on which our results
are based.
The class of models F contains many familiar examples. The model of utilitarianism
in Example 1 is one such instance, as is the generalization of the additive dierence model
of Tversky (1969) in Example 2.8 If  in that model is increasing, utility functions with a
greater intensity of preference over the set A receive greater weight in the aggregate util-
ity, as in the focus-weighted model of K} oszegi and Szeidl (2012) (where each utility func-
tion corresponds to a dimension of a good, and  is the identity). If  is decreasing, the
model may be seen as a context-dependent version of the models of relative utilitarian-
ism in Karni (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), and Segal (2000), where a DM's weight
in society is normalized by her utility range over the grand set of alternatives. Exam-
ple 3, the dual-self model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006), does not exactly t into the





usr(a0) usr(a)]  is treated dierently than the short-run selves;
however, the summation corresponding to the short-run selves is in F, as is the part corre-
sponding to the long-run self. Our results extend in this case and others with nonanonymous
aggregation; see Supplementary Appendix A. Finally, we mention below some other models
in F which are equivalent or closely related to ones in the existing literature.9
Example 4 - Loss aversion of Tversky and Kahneman (1991), with endoge-












, where r() determines the reference point
against which u(a) is evaluated for each utility function u; m() captures the impact of abso-
lute valuations on aggregate utility; and the loss aversion function `() satises the properties
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991): steeper disutility from losses than utility from
gains, and weakly diminishing sensitivity.
The above model has been applied in various forms. Kivetz et al. (2004) consider goods
8Tversky (1969) accounts for potentially intransitive pairwise choice behavior by positing utilities
V1;v2;:::;vn and an odd  : R ! R such that x  y if and only if
Pn
i=1 (vi(xi)   vi(yi)) > 0. Ob-
serve that a is preferred to b in the pair fa;bg if and only if
P
u2U (ju(a) u(b)j)(u(a) u(b)), where each
summand is an odd function of u(a)   u(b).
9Two additional aggregators are studied in Supplementary Appendix 7. where we show how to rationalize
two simple choice procedures discussed in Kalai et al. (2002): the median procedure and the second-best
procedure. In particular, Kalai et al. (2002) show that within their framework, the number of selves needed
to rationalize these choice procedures becomes unbounded as the alternative space grows large. We show
they can be rationalized in our framework with two selves, regardless of the size of the alternative space.
8(e.g., laptops) which have dened attribute levels (e.g., processor speed) and posit utility
levels (\partworths") for a given attribute. Their contextual concavity model species r() 
min(), m()  0, and `()  () for some concavity parameter . Similarly in Orhun (2009),
each u can be interpreted as the valuation of alternatives under some attribute. Orhun (2009)
nds the optimal product line for a model corresponding to the case where m is linear, ` is
the standard kinked-linear loss aversion function (that is, `(x) = x for x > 0, `(x) = x for
x < 0 and some  > 1), and r is a weighted average of valuations.
Example 5 - Nash bargaining solution with an endogenous disagreement point.
The aggregate utility of an alternative a in a choice set A is
Q
u2U(+u(a) mina02A u(a0)),
where  is any positive constant to ensure each term is strictly positive.
Example 5, which species the worst outcome as the disagreement point, is similar to
Kaneko and Nakamura (1979), although they assume the utility of the worst outcome is the
same in all choice sets. A more general theory of context-dependent disagreement points in
the bargaining solution is oered by Conley, McLean and Wilkie (1997).
These and other models in F share some prominent characteristics. First, as in many
existing models of household and multi-self decision-making (and in expected utility), ag-
gregation depends on cardinal information in the utility functions. Building on cardinality,
these models oer the possibility of compromise. This is a dening feature of the models
of household choice, which are interested in ecient outcomes arising from an unmodeled
bargaining process. As opposed to Kalai et al. (2002), but in accordance with others (e.g.,
Tversky (1969), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Kivetz et al. (2004), Fudenberg and Levine
(2006), Green and Hojman (2009)), the utility functions in these models have some contri-
bution to aggregate utility on every choice set.10 Finally, the weight allocated to a utility
function may depend on how it evaluates the options in the choice set. For example, in
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), a long-run self must exert more costly self control when more
appealing options are available. Such models can also capture the behavior in Shar et al.
(1993), where the primary rationales for purchasing depend on the attributes of available
products. As seen from Example 1 (utilitarianism), the weights allocated to utility functions
must depend on the choice set in some way in order to generate irrational behavior.
10Psychologists believe that a uid form of compromise among selves is necessary for healthy behavior.
This is as opposed to disassociated selves (i.e., overly autonomous selves), or a high self-concept dierentiation
(a lack of interrelatedness of selves across contexts) both of which are connected to pathological or unhealthy
behavior; see Power (2007), Donahue, Robins, Roberts and John (1993), and Mitchell (1993).
93 An index of irrationality
What kinds of behavior can an aggregator rationalize? Consider one of the simplest types of
aggregators, the model of utilitarianism: f(a;A;U) =
P
u2U u(a). The only choice function
that utilitarianism can rationalize is rational choice, that is, choice which satises the Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). IIA requires that if a 2 A  B and c(B) = a then
c(A) = a. This says that if an alternative is chosen from a set, then it should be chosen from
any subset in which it is contained. It is well known that a choice function can be rational-
ized as the maximization of a single preference relation if and only if it has no violations of
IIA. A non-utilitarian model of aggregation, however, might be able to rationalize a choice
function that violates IIA. To identify choice functions that deviate from rationality but are
rationalizable, this paper provides an index of irrationality based on IIA violations.
The number of IIA violations can be determined straightforwardly for choice functions
over three-element sets; e.g., if the choice over pairs is transitive but the second-best element
according to the pairs is selected from the triple, there is one violation of IIA. For a larger
set of alternatives, there are dierent plausible ways to determine whether a set (or more
precisely, the choice from that set) causes an IIA violation. Consequently, there are dierent
ways to dene the number of violations. One possible measure would be based on the
following characterization of an IIA violation.
Characterization 1. A set A causes an IIA violation given c() if there exists a set B  A
such that c(B) 2 A n fc(A)g.
To illustrate, consider X = fw;x;y;zg and the choice function c() given by:
c(fw;x;y;zg) = w;
c(fw;x;yg) = c(fw;y;zg) = y; c(fw;x;zg) = w; c(fx;y;zg) = x;
c(fw;xg) = c(fw;zg) = w; c(fw;yg) = c(fy;zg) = y; c(fx;yg) = c(fx;zg) = x:
The sets fw;x;yg, fw;y;zg, and fw;yg are IIA violations under this characterization, be-
cause IIA dictates that if c(fw;x;y;zg) = w then the choice from those sets should be w.
However, notice that choosing y from fw;yg is consistent with IIA in view of the fact that
y is chosen from fw;x;yg and fw;y;zg. Consequently, one might want to view A as an IIA
violation only if its choice contradicts that of the rst superset having an IIA implication
for A. This idea is formalized below.
Characterization 2. A set A causes an IIA violation given c() if there exists a set B  A
10such that c(B) 2 A n fc(A)g and for every A0 such that A  A0  B, we have c(A0) 62 A.
Under Characterization 2, only fw;x;yg and fw;y;zg are violations in the example above;
in view of those choices, IIA dictates picking y from fw;yg. Thus, the second characterization
goes further than the rst in viewing each choice set A causing a violation as a regime
change; that is, as having IIA implications in all subsets of A in which c(A) is contained. As
evidenced by the following example, one could take the characterization of IIA violations as
regime changes even further:
c(fw;x;y;zg) = w;
c(fw;x;yg) = c(fw;x;zg) = w; c(fw;y;zg) = y; c(fx;y;zg) = x;
c(fw;xg) = c(fw;zg) = w; c(fw;yg) = c(fy;zg) = y; c(fx;yg) = c(fx;zg) = x:
IIA implies that if w is chosen from fw;x;y;zg, then it should also be chosen from fw;y;zg
and fw;yg. At the same time, the choice of y from fw;yg is implied by the choice of y
from fw;y;zg (which itself contradicts the choice of fw;x;y;zg), but not by the choice of w
from fw;x;yg. Under Characterization 2, fw;yg is considered a violation { even though y is
implied by the IIA violation fw;y;zg, there is no choice set in between fw;yg and fw;x;yg.
Consider now the view that each IIA violation is a regime change which has implications
for all subsets in which the choice is contained. Then, the choice of y from fw;y;zg implies
that y should be chosen from any subset of fw;y;zg in which it is contained { in particular,
y should be chosen from fw;yg. Moreover, no other regime change has a contradictory
implication for fw;yg. Consequently, under the following characterization, which renes the
previous two, the only set causing a violation is fw;y;zg. The characterization is iterative,
starting from X, then examining sets of size jXj   1, etc., until reaching sets of size two.
Characterization 3. The set X does not cause an IIA violation. Inductively, for a set
A  X, let V(A) be the set of smallest supersets of A which cause an IIA violation and
whose choice is contained in A. Then we say that A causes an IIA violation if
(1) There exists B such that A  B, c(B) 2 A n fc(A)g and for every A0 such that
A  A0  B, c(A0) 62 A; and
(2) If V(A) 6= ; then there exists B0 2 V(A) such that c(B0) 6= c(A).
Condition (1) is simply Characterization 2. The renement in condition (2) ensures a
set is not considered a violation if its choice is implied by the previous regime changes. For
11any choice function, the number of sets causing an IIA violation is smallest under Charac-
terization 3 and highest under Characterization 1. We dene the index of irrationality as
follows.
Denition 2 (Index of Irrationality). The index of irrationality of a choice function c() is
given by II(c) = #fA 2 P(X) j A causes an IIA violation under Characterization 3g.
Because the results in this paper determine how many utility functions would be sucient
to explain a choice behavior with a given index of irrationality, the result is tighter the smaller
is the index of irrationality used. Another possible measure would be the minimal number of
sets where the choice function must be changed to make it rational; this measure, however,
is not comparable with our own { it can be either larger or smaller than the index above.11
4 Scale-invariant models
We begin by introducing our results for a special class of models in F which satisfy a scale-
invariance property. Models in F are ordinally equivalent to the form
P
u2U g(a;fu(a0)ga02A)).
We say that f 2 F is in the class of models F if g(a;fu(a0)ga02A) = ()g(a;fu(a0)ga02A)
for any  2 R and some invertible and odd  : R ! R. This says the unit in which pref-
erence intensity is measured does not aect rankings. This class includes utilitarianism as
well as various menu-dependent variations. As previously noted, utilitarianism explains only
rational choice behavior. This section shows that being able to explain only a limited set of
behaviors is a nongeneric feature of aggregators in this class.
Consider the following model of reference-dependent aggregation in F.
Example 6 - Simple reference dependence. The aggregate utility of an alternative a
in a choice set A is
P
u2U(u(a)   mean u(A)), where  is an odd integer and mean u(A)
is a geometric or arithmetic mean over the set fu(a0)ga02A. This is a reference-dependent
variation of the CRRA form, where the origin is shifted.
The reference dependence in Example 6 permits that model to rationalize a much wider
array of behaviors than can utilitarianism. To understand why, let us rst examine choice
11Indeed, suppose that pairwise choices exhibit the transitive ranking a preferred to b preferred to c. Under
this paper's measure, there is one violation of IIA if c(fa;b;cg) = b, which is defeated once in the pair fb;cg,
and two violations of IIA if c(fa;b;cg) = c, which is defeated twice. The alternative measure counts one
violation either way. To see that the alternative measure can also be larger, consider the choice function in
the example above. The alternative measure counts two violations, while this paper's measure counts one.
12behavior over only three alternatives. There are three possible kinds of irrational choice
functions dened over a three-element set. One possibility is transitive choice, where the
second-best element (from the transitive ranking) is chosen from the triple; another is tran-
sitive choice, where the worst element is chosen from the triple; and the third is intransitive
choice. Using the model in Example 6, it is easy to construct rationalizations for all three
of these behaviors.
The rst part of the following theorem shows that if a model of aggregation in F can
rationalize the last two irrational behaviors over a triple of alternatives, then it can rationalize
any choice function dened over any space of alternatives. The second part of the theorem
shows that a generic aggregator in F (including Example 6) can rationalize any choice
behavior with a uniform bound on the number of utility functions needed. To describe the
sup metric through which genericity is dened, note that by scale invariance, there is a
natural bijection between (1) aggregators in F applied to pairs and triples of elements, and
(2) the set of pairs of operators 
 = fO1;O2 j O1 : 2 ! R2; O2 : 3 ! R3g, where 2;3
are the 2- and 3-dimensional simplices, respectively. The distance between two such pairs
(O1;O2) and (O0
1;O0
2) is dened as maxi=1;2 supx2Ri jOi(x)   O0
i(x)j.
Theorem 1. Let X be a nite grand set of alternatives. Then:
(i) Fix any aggregator f 2 F and three alternatives x;y;z 2 X. If f can rationalize
both (1) intransitive choice over x;y;z and (2) transitive choice over x;y;z where the
worst pairwise element is best in the triple fx;y;zg, then f can rationalize any choice
function c dened over X.
(ii) The set of aggregators in F that can rationalize any choice function c using at most
1 + 5  II(c) utility functions is open and dense.
The proof of this theorem appears in the Appendix, and is discussed in the next section.
Theorem 1 formalizes the sense in which only being able to explain rational choice behavior
is fragile. Once even a small amount of irrationality can be explained (only two types of irra-
tional behavior out of the three possible types of irrational behavior over three alternatives),
an additive and scale-invariant model can rationalize any choice behavior with suciently
many utility functions. Moreover, the ability to explain any behavior is generic in this class,
with at most ve \good reasons" needed for every \mistake" made. Note that the result gives
a lower bound on the set of behaviors a generic aggregator in F can rationalize, thereby
providing a linear connection between the complexity of the observed behavior (as measured
13by the number of IIA violations) and the degree of freedom in the model (as measured by
the number of utility functions). Given n utility functions, a generic aggregator in F can
rationalize any choice function c, dened on any nite grand set of alternatives X, that
exhibits an index of irrationality of at most n 1
5 . Thus, in spite of having a structured form,
essentially any aggregator in F can rationalize any choice function with suciently many
utility functions. In other words, a model of decision-making satisfying the above properties
must put a priori restrictions on the number of individuals or selves in order to generate a
refutable theory.
Given a model of aggregation and any triple of alternatives, it is very easy to check
whether the model can rationalize the two irrational behaviors described in part (i) of The-
orem 1. But the proof of Theorem 1 also reveals a simple sucient condition for checking
whether a model f is of the generic type in part (ii). It suces to nd a single utility
function dened over a triple fx;y;zg for which f \stretches" utility dierences over pairs,
f(x;fx;zg;u) f(z;fx;zg) 6= f(x;fx;yg;u) f(y;fx;yg;u)+f(y;fy;zg;u) f(y;fy;zg;u);
and for which f's evaluation of alternatives in the triple is not xed by the pairwise rankings,
f(x;fx;y;zg;u)   f(y;fx;y;zg;u) + f(x;fx;y;zg;u)   f(z;fx;y;zg;u) 6= f(x;fx;yg;u)  
f(y;fx;yg;u) + f(x;fx;zg;u)   f(z;fx;zg;u). For example, the utility function u(y) =
4 > u(z) = 2 > u(x) = 1 shows that the model in Example 4 using an arithmetic
mean is in the generic class. By contrast, utilitarianism and generalizations of the form
f(a;A;u) = u(a)+h(A), where the choice set cannot change intensity of preference within a
set, fail the sucient condition (and, in fact, explain only rational choice). The proof shows
that the sucient condition is satised generically. Nonetheless, it is not necessary { even
aggregators that fail to satisfy the condition may be able to rationalize all choice behaviors.
As seen from our upcoming results, the model of Example 2 using linear  can rationalize
any behavior with ve utility functions per IIA violation, but fails the sucient condition.
5 A rationalization theorem and procedure
In this section we present our main result, which determines how many utility functions
would be sucient to explain a choice function based on its index of irrationality. Before
doing so, we begin with an illustrative example.
145.1 Illustration









for some monotonic function . Let us suppose  is increasing, and examine how this
aggregator behaves on an arbitrary three-element set of alternatives fa;b;cg. In particular,
consider the following collection of utility functions U = (u1;u2;u3;u4;u5) dened on fa;b;cg
(in each column, the alternative on the left receives the utility number to its right):














It is easy to verify that the aggregator selects a from the choice set fa;bg. Observe that
f(a;fa;bg;U) = 4(2) + (1) and f(b;fa;bg;U) = 2(2) + 3(1). Hence f(a;fa;bg;U) >
f(b;fa;bg;U) since (2) > (1). For any other choice set, the aggregator assigns equal
utility to all alternatives:
f(a;fa;cg;U) = f(c;fa;cg;U) = 2(0) + (1) + 2(2);
f(b;fb;cg;U) = f(c;fb;cg;U) = 3(1) + 2(2);
f(a;fa;b;cg;U) = f(b;fa;b;cg;U) = f(c;fa;b;cg;U) = 5(2):
That is, under the collection U, alternative a receives strictly higher aggregate utility than
b in the choice set fa;bg, and there is complete indierence in all other choice problems.
We will call such a collection U dened on a three-alternative set fa;b;cg a triple-basis
for this aggregator f. As we now show, triple-bases can serve as basic building blocks for
rationalizations of choice functions on arbitrary spaces of alternatives. Recall the example
choice function c(), dened on X = fw;x;y;zg, from Section 3:
c(fw;x;y;zg) = w;
c(fw;x;yg) = c(fw;x;zg) = w; c(fw;y;zg) = y; c(fx;y;zg) = x;
c(fw;xg) = c(fw;zg) = w; c(fw;yg) = c(fy;zg) = y; c(fx;yg) = c(fx;zg) = x:
15This choice function's index of irrationality is equal to one. Using the triple basis above, we
construct the following collection Ufw;y;zg = (u1;u2;u3;u4;u5), dened on X:














The above utility functions are constructed by letting the choice from fw;y;zg, which is y,
play the role of a in the triple-basis; letting the unchosen alternatives in fw;y;zg, which are
w and z, play the role of b; and nally, letting the alternatives not in fw;y;zg, which is only
x here, play the role of c.
Using Ufw;y;zg, how does f evaluate the alternatives in each choice set A  X? Since x
has the same utility as c in the calculations above, it is easy to set that f(;A;Ufw;y;zg) is
constant for any set A containing x. Since the unchosen alternatives w;z in fw;y;zg are
given equal utilities, f(;A;Ufw;y;zg) is constant on fw;zg. Finally, since y plays the role of
a, and w;z play the role of b, the previous calculations imply that for any A  fw;y;zg
containing y, we have
f(y;A;U
fw;y;zg) > f(~ y;A;U
fw;y;zg) for all ~ y 2 A n fyg:
Therefore, the utility functions in Ufw;y;zg rationalize the choice from any set A  fw;y;zg
which contains y, and have no impact on any other choice set.
Since the collection Ufw;y;zg has implications only for the IIA violation fw;y;zg and
its subsets, one needs an additional utility function to rationalize the remaining \rational"
choices. We construct a nal utility function u whose utility range is suciently small
to not overturn any strict preferences induced from Ufw;y;zg, and which has the ranking
u(w) > u(x) > u(y) > u(z) derived from standard revealed preference; that is, from
observing w = c(X), x = c(X n fwg), and y = c(X n fw;xg). By construction, the utility
functions (u;Ufw;y;zg) rationalize c().
5.2 Rationalizability result
Observe that the triple basis U given above would still be a triple-basis for the generalized
additive dierence model if we were to scale all the utilities by a common constant. Loosely
16speaking, this means that for any , the utility functions in U can rationalize being indierent
among all alternatives in subsets of fa;b;cg except for having a -amount of strict preference
within one pair. This is a property we term triple-solvability, and is formally dened below
for any model of aggregation.
Denition 3. Given a triple fa;b;cg and model of aggregation f, the collection U 2 U(fa;b;cg)
is a triple-basis if f(a;fa;bg;U) > f(b;fa;bg;U) and f(;A;U) is constant for all other
A  fa;b;cg. The aggregator f is triple-solvable with k utility functions if for every  > 0,
there is a triple-basis U 2 Uk(fa;b;cg) with maxa;b2A;Afa;b;cg;u2U jf(a;A;u) f(b;A;u)j < 
Given an aggregator, it is easy to check for the existence of a triple-basis. Indeed, triple
bases can be found for the aggregators featured earlier.12 For scale-invariant aggregators,
which satisfy the property that measuring utilities in a dierent unit does not change the
ordering implied by the aggregator, checking the property is particularly simple, since it then
suces to construct one triple-basis which can be scaled as needed. More generally, it is easy
to see from our construction that it suces for there to be triple-bases using only jXj   2
's, where each is smaller than the amount of strict preference under the previous 's. It
turns out that triple solvability holds broadly among the class of aggregators featured here,
and in fact the class of aggregators F generically satises this property. The fact that these
examples illustrate various models of multi-self decision-making proposed in the literature
suggests that this property, which can be checked simply by looking at choice behavior on
three-element sets, holds broadly. As our next result shows, this behavioral property has
strong implications for the explanatory power of a model.
Theorem 2. Suppose f 2 F is triple-solvable with kf utility functions. Then, for any choice
function c, dened on any nite grand set of alternatives X, no more than 1+kf II(c) utility
functions are needed to rationalize c.
We sketch below the proof of Theorem 2, describing our general rationalization method.
Note that an alternative statement of the result is as follows: using n utility functions, f can
12Solvability of the simple reference dependence model will follow from the sucient condition it satises.
For the case of the contextual concavity model of Kivetz et al. (2004), the following is a triple basis for any
 6= 1: u1(a) = 4;u1(b) = 3;u1(c) = 1, u2(a) = 3;u2(b) = 1;u2(c) = 2, u3(a) = 3;u3(b) = 4;u3(c) = 1,
u4(a) = 1;u4(b) = u4(c) = 3, u5(a) = 2;u5(b) = 1;u5(c) = 3, u6(a) = 1;u6(b) = 2;u6(c) = 4. For the case of
loss aversion with kinked linear ` and parameter 2, the following is a triple basis (there is some rounding error):
u1(a) =  2:112;u1(b) =  1:275;u1(c) = 7:225, u2(a) = 0;u2(b) = 1:445;u2(c) = 1, u3(a) = 6;u3(b) =
7:225;u3(c) = 4, u4(a) =  4:766;u4(b) =  2:938;u4(c) = 0, u5(a) = 5;u5(b) =  5:981;u5(c) = 2:814.
For bargaining with endogenous disagreement point, the following is a triple basis (there is some rounding
error): u1(a) = 2:847;u1(b) = 1;u1(c) = 7:634, u2(a) = 0;u2(b) = 4:288;u2(c) = 1, u3(a) = 6;u3(b) =
 :129;u3(c) = 4, u4(a) =  4:651;u4(b) =  :949;u4(c) = 0, u5(a) = 5;u5(b) =  1:619;u5(c) =  15:8.
17rationalize any choice function c, dened on any nite grand set of alternatives X, whose
index of irrationality is at most n 1
kf . Hence, the result also gives a lower bound on the set of
rationalizable behaviors for a xed number of utility functions, providing a linear connection
between the index of irrationality of a choice function and the degree of freedom in the model
(as measured by the number of utility functions).
Note that for each aggregator f, the proportionality constant kf is independent of the
size of the alternative space X, and can be calculated using any triple of alternatives (it
is simply the number of group members in a triple basis). This means that the number of
utility functions that are sucient to rationalize a choice function on the alternative space
X does not increase if the choice function is extended to a larger alternative space ^ X in
a manner such that no additional IIA violations are created. This formalizes the sense in
which the size of the rationalization depends directly on the complexity of the behavior and
not the size of the alternative space; the size of the alternative space matters only in the
sense that it bounds the number of IIA violations that are possible.
Sketch of proof: a universal rationalization method. Suppose f is triple-solvable
with kf utility functions. Given an arbitrary X and any choice function c dened on X,
the procedure works as follows. We examine all possible choice sets in X from smallest to
largest, rst going through all choice sets of size two, then all choice sets of size three, etc.
We ignore any choice set that does not cause an IIA violation (under Characterization 3).
For each choice set A that does cause an IIA violation, the construction creates a group UA
dened on X, whose utility values match those of a triple basis: c(A) plays the role of the
preferred element in the pair, A n fc(A)g plays the role of the unchosen element in the pair,
and X n A plays the role of the third element. This implies that:
1. c(A) is selected under f  UA from every subset of A in which it is contained; and
2. The group members in UA cancel each other out under f on every other choice set
(that is, on sets not containing c(A) or sets containing some element of X n A)
The triple-basis used to generate UA is \indierent enough" over the alternatives so that the
trickle-down eect of UA does not overturn the strict preference of previously constructed
utility functions (corresponding to other IIA violations). Finally, the construction creates an
extra utility function u, that is indierent enough never to overturn any strict preferences
18from existing utility functions. Using standard revealed preference, u allocates the highest
utility to c(X), the next highest utility to X n fc(X)g, and so on.
This procedure constructs 1 + kf  II(c) utility functions which together rationalize c()
under the model f. The construction ensures that c(A) is selected from any set causing an
IIA violation; one need only check that constructed utility functions do not interfere with
choices associated with sets that do not cause IIA violations. To loosely illustrate the idea,
consider any nested sequence of choice sets that decreases by one alternative. Given X, or
any set which does not cause an IIA violation, all utility functions except u are indierent,
hence the preferences of u prevail. For the rst set of the sequence that contradicts the choice
from X, a triple-basis was created with utility functions which overrule u and guarantee
that the choice from this set under c() is the unique f-maximizer (while the other triple-
bases created will be indierent). Similarly, whenever along the sequence there is a set that
contradicts the choice of the previous set, another triple-basis was created that overrules all
utility functions created in association with larger sets.
It is easy to see that the proposed rationalization procedure can also be modied to
generate rationalizations of choice correspondences.
Theorem 1, for scale-invariant aggregators, is proved in ve steps. The rst is knowing
that if f is triple-solvable with k utility functions, we can rationalize any choice function c
with 1+kII(c) utility functions. This is simply Theorem 2. The next step is showing that if a
certain matrix { constructed by permuting possible aggregate utility dierences given various
rankings of three alternatives a;b and c { has a nonzero determinant, then the aggregator f is
triple-solvable. Next, we prove part (i) by showing that if the two types of irrational behaviors
can be explained, then the above matrix has nonzero determinant. To prove part (ii), we
rst show that if the sucient condition described after Theorem 1 is satised, then the
above matrix has nonzero determinant and the aggregator is triple-solvable with ve utility
functions. Finally, we prove the sucient condition is generically satised. For intuition on
why the bound is ve, notice that checking whether a collection constitutes a triple basis
requires checking ve aggregate utility dierences: the aggregate utility dierence between
any two pairs of alternatives within the set fa;b;cg, and the aggregate utility dierence
between the alternatives within each of the three pairs fa;bg, fb;cg, and fa;cg. It turns out
that a generic model in F \stretches" utility dierences in a nonlinear, menu-dependent
fashion, and that under scale-invariance, having ve utility functions provides enough degrees
of independence to ensure that a triple basis can be constructed.
196 Extensions
6.1 Weakening solvability: one utility function per violation
While triple solvability is a property that is broadly satised, it can be seen from our con-
struction that our theorem would still hold under a weaker condition. It suces that there
exist a collection which is arbitrarily close to being indierent on all but one subset fa;bg
of a triple fa;b;cg. We formalize this idea in Supplementary Appendix A, where we extend
the notion of a triple-basis to an approximate triple-basis. For some aggregators, approxi-
mate triple-solvability can yield a triple-basis with drastically fewer utility functions. Indeed,








where limx!1 h(x)x = 0. Under such an aggregator, the presence of an alternative with a
very high utility level under one self means that self is given less say in the decision process
(a \populist"-type model). This can be used to create a single-member approximate triple-
basis u: let u(a) and u(b) such that f(a;fa;bg;fa;b;cg;u)   f(b;fa;bg;fa;b;cg;u) =  (for
small enough  this is always possible), and let u(c) be high enough so that u is "-indierent
between any two elements given sets containing c. Theorem 5 in Supplementary Appendix
A then implies that only one utility function is needed to rationalize each violation (or
alternatively, using n utility function, the aggregator can rationalize all choice functions
with index of irrationality up to n   1. This means that for any choice function with one
IIA violation, only two selves are needed | which is clearly a tight bound. Note that there
are exponentially many choice functions with index of irrationality equal to one: starting
from any rational choice function c, choose an arbitrary A  X, modify the choice to any
a 2 A n fc(A)g, and make a the choice in all subsets of A containing a.
6.2 Type-dependent aggregators
The examples of aggregators above all treat utility functions in the same way. However,
many models in the existing literature on multi-self decision-making propose methods of
aggregation that treat some selves dierently than others. For example, Fudenberg and
Levine (2006) propose a dual-self impulse control model with a long-run self exerting costly
20self-control over a short-run self. One way to generalize this aggregator to any number of




n, as well as one long-run self ulr. Accommodating such type-dependent models
of aggregation in our framework requires an extension of the framework and some extra
notation, but no conceptual innovation. In particular, the denition of an aggregator must
be extended to include a set of possible types, and the denition of a self must be extended
to include a type. For ease of exposition, we restricted ourselves to the simplied framework
in the main text and present the extension of the framework in Supplementary Appendix A.
Our results carry over to the extended framework.
6.3 Systematic IIA violations
Our construction allocates an (approximate) triple-basis for every increment of the index
of irrationality. However, there can be IIA violations that are \in the same direction"
(that do not contradict each other). In this case, parts of the associated triple-bases in our
construction can be combined (or collapsed) together to yield tighter bounds. For example,
recall the triple-basis for the intensity-weighted aggregator, and x some alternative a. Every
time the choice of a from some set causes an IIA violation, the triple-basis constructed has
a utility function u5 in which a is preferred to X n fag, all elements of which are indierent
to each other. Under the intensity-weighted aggregator, all of the u5's constructed when the
choice was a can be collapsed into a utility function.
This eect is particularly pronounced when the triple-basis has only one utility function,
as in the approximately triple-solvable aggregators introduced above. Consider the following
example: let x 2 X, and let 1 and 2 be strict orderings on X such that x 1 x and
x 2 x for every x 2 X n fxg, and y 1 x for x;y 2 X n fxg if and only if x 2 y.
Consider a decision-maker who selects the best element according to 1 from choice sets not
containing x, but selects the best element according to 2 from choice sets containing x.
This behavior describes, for example, a customer in a restaurant who chooses the tastiest
item from a menu if it does not contain onion rings, while choosing the healthiest item in
the presence of onion rings, because they are so greasy as to make the customer feel guilty
about his eating habits. The above behavior an index of irrationality of jXj 2.13 However,
these IIA violations do not contradict each other: if the choice from set B contradicts the
choice from A  B, then there is no B0  B such that the choice from B0 contradicts the
13In particular, the sets causing IIA violations are X n fxg, X n (fxg [ fc(X n fxg)g), etc. etc.
21choice from B. This can be used to merge all collections of selves into a single collection,
reducing the number of selves required to rationalize the customer's choice function. Recall
the aggregator introduced in the previous subsection, which was shown to be approximately
triple-solvable with a single utility function. Our construction calls for (i) creating one utility
function which has the ranking in 2; and (ii) creating a utility function for all sets associated
with an IIA violation, such that the utility of x is suciently high that the utility function
becomes close enough to indierent in the presence of x, and among the other alternatives
allocates the highest utility to the choice from the given set. The latter utility functions can
all be collapsed into a single one which agrees with the ranking of 1 over X n fxg (while
keeping the utility of x at a level that makes it nearly indierent in the presence of x).
Our construction implies the above choice function can be rationalized with two selves |
which is a tight bound.
7 Discussion
This paper proposes an index of irrationality and examines how many utility functions are
sucient to explain choice behavior, under a large class of existing models of multi-self
decision-making. It should not be dicult to incorporate choice correspondences into our
results on rationalizability by extending our denition of IIA violations for choice functions
to count both violations of Sen's  and Sen's  (axioms that, when taken together, are
equivalent to rational choice behavior for correspondences). By examining more specic
models instead of the broad class of aggregation rules investigated in this paper, sharper
predictions on implied choice with a xed number of utility functions may be possible. As
in Kalai et al. (2002), who study a dictatorial model, we provide an upper bound on the
number of utility functions required to rationalize a choice behavior. In contrast to their
setting, constructing a rationalization using models in the class studied here may be dicult
without the aid of the general procedure we provide. Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) have
shown that the problem of nding the minimal number of selves needed in the Kalai et al.
(2002) model is NP-complete, and we expect nding the minimal number that works in the
class of models studied here to be comparably hard. We leave this open problem, as well as
extending our framework to dynamic settings, to future research.
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We prove our results for aggregators satisfying the following properties (it is straightfor-
ward to show that these properties are all satised by any f 2 F). To introduce them, we
dene one piece of notation: for any two collections of utility functions U;U0 2 U(X), we
denote by hU;U0i the combined collection (u1;:::;ujUj;u0
1;:::;u0
jU0j) 2 U(X).
P1 (Neutrality). For any permutation  : X ! X, f((a);(A);U   1) = f(a;A;U):
P2 (Consistency). For any u 2 RX, u(a)  u(b) if and only if f(a;A;u)  f(b;A;u):
P3 (Reinforcement). If f(a;A;U)  f(b;A;U) and f(a;A;X; ^ U)  f(b;A; ^ U) then
f(a;A;hU;U0i)  f(b;A;X;hU;U0i), with strict inequality if one of the above is strict.
P4 (Continuity to near-indierent additions). If f(a;A;U) > f(b;A;U), then for any k 2 Z
there exists  > 0 such that f(a;A;hU;U0i) > f(b;A;hU;U0i) for any U0 2 Uk(X) with
maxa;b2A;AX;u02U0 jf(a;A;u0)   f(b;A;u0)j < .
P5 (Prole equivalence). U(a) = U(^ a) implies f(b;A [ fag;U) = f(b;A [ f^ ag;U) 8 b 2 A.
P6 (Independence of unavailable alternatives). For any X;X0 2 X such that A  X \ X0,
and UX 2 U(X) and UX0 2 U(X0) that agree on A (i.e., UX0(a) = UX(a) for all a 2 A), the
aggregator satises f(;A;X;UX) = f(;A;X0;UX0):
Proof of Theorem 2
For an arbitrary choice function c we will construct a collection of 1+kII(c) members which
will be shown to rationalize c. This implies the claim in the theorem. In particular, we will
construct k members for each set with which an IIA violation is associated, and an extra
member for X. Let I1 = fA1
1;:::;A1
i1g be the subsets of X such that there is an IIA violation
associated with the set, but there is no proper subset of the set with which an IIA violation
is associated. For j  2, let Ij = fA1
1;:::;A1
ij+1g be the subsets of X such that there is an




with which an IIA violation is associated. Let j be the largest j such that Ij 6= ;.
We will now iteratively construct a group of k members for each set associated with an
IIA violation, starting with sets in I1. Consider any group of k members  U1 = ( u1
1;:::  u1
k)
23that solves the triple fa;b;cg (the existence of such a triple follows from triple-solvability).










i(a) if x = c(A)
 u1
i(b) if x 2 A; x 6= c(A)
 u1
i(c) if x 62 A
for every i = 1;:::;k: Suppose now that UA is dened for every A 2
j S
k=1
Ik for some j  1.
Let Uk be the group Uk = (UAk
1;:::;U
Ak
ik), for k = 1;:::;j. Let b Uj = (U1;:::;Uj). By P4, there
exists  > 0 such that for any -indierent group of k members U0,
f(a;A;X; b Uj) > f(b;A;X; b Uj) implies f(a;A;X;(b Uj;U
0)) > f(b;A;X;(b Uj;U
0)):
Then by P3 and P6, we know
f(a;A;X; b Uj; e U1;:::; e Um) > f(b;A;X; b Uj; e U1;:::; e Um) implies
f(a;A;X;(b Uj; e U1;:::; e Um;U
0)) > f(b;A;X;(b Uj; e U1;:::; e Um;U
0))
for any e U1;:::; e Um group of (exactly) indierent members. Let now Ij+1 = fA1
1;:::;A1
ij+1g be
the subsets of X such that there is an IIA violation associated with the set, but there is
no proper subset of the set outside Ij with which an IIA violation is associated. By triple-
solvability with k members, there is a -indierent group of k members  Uj+1 = ( u
j+1
1 ;:::  u
j+1
k )












i (a) if x = c(A)
 u
j+1
i (b) if x 2 A; x 6= c(A)
 u
j+1
i (c) if x 62 A




The above procedure generates a group kII(c) members in j steps. Then by P3 and P4
there is j > 0 such that for any j-indierent u, f(a;A;X;Uj) > f(b;A;X;Uj) implies
f(a;A;X;(Uj;u)) > f(b;A;X;(Uj;u)). Finally, construct one more member the following
way: let a1 = c(X) and ak = c(X n fa1;a2;:::ak 1g) for 2  k  n. Construct u : X ! R
such that u(a1) > u(a2) >  > u(an) and u is j-indierent. We show Uc  (Uj;u)
rationalizes c under aggregator f.
24Observation 1. For any set A with which there is an IIA violation associated, by the
construction of UA and by P1 and P5, f(a;B;X;UA) = f(b;B;X;UA) 8 a;b 2 B and B such
that either BnA 6= ; or c(A) = 2 B, and f(c(A);B;X;UA) > f(b;B;X;UA) = f(b0;B;X;UA)
8 b;b0 2 B n fc(A)g and B such that B n A = ; and c(A) 2 B.
We will now show that the choice induced by f from any choice set is equal to the choice
implied by c. First, note that this holds for X, since by Observation 1, f(a;X;X;UA) =
f(b;X;X;UA) for every a;b 2 X and every A with which there is an IIA violation as-
sociated. Moreover, f(c(X);X;X;u) > f(a;X;X;u) 8 a 2 X n fc(X)g by P2. Then
repeated application of P3 implies f(c(X);X;X;Uc) > f(a;X;X;Uc) 8 a 2 X n fc(X)g.
Next, consider any A ( X which causes an IIA violation. Suppose A 2 Ij. Observa-
tion 1 implies that for any B 2 (
j S
l=1
Il) n A, f(a;A;UB) = f(a0;A;UB) 8 a;a0 2 A, and
f(c(A);A;X;UA) > f(a;A;X;UA) 8 a 2 A. Then repeated implication of P3 implies
f(c(A);A;X;Uj) > f(a;A;X;Uj) 8 a 2 A. By construction then f(c(A);A;X;Uc) >
f(a;A;X;Uc) 8 a 2 A. Finally, consider a set A that does not cause an IIA viola-
tion. One reason why this could happen is that condition (2) does not hold. This means
V(A) 6= ; and for every B0 2 V(A), c(B0) = c(A). Let j be the smallest j such that
for some A0 2 Ij, A  A0 and c(A0) 2 A. Then the construction of Uc implies that
f(c(A);A;X;Uc) > f(a;A;X;Uc) 8 a 2 A, and the proof is complete. Therefore, assume
that condition (2) holds but condition (1) does not hold. There are several cases.
Case 1: For all a 2 A, there is no B  A such that a = c(B). Then by construc-
tion u(c(A)) > u(a) 8 a 2 A n fc(A)g. Moreover, by Observation 1, f(a;A;X;UB) =
f(a0;A;X;UB) 8 a;a0 2 A and B with which an IIA violation is associated. Repeated use
of P3, together with P2, implies f(c(A);A;X;Uc) > f(a;A;X;Uc) 8 a 2 A.
Case 2: There is a unique a 2 A such that for some B  A, c(B) = a. First we note
that a = c(A) is necessary, otherwise A would have caused an IIA violation. There are two
subcases:
Case 2a: For every B such that B  A and c(B) = a, B did not cause an IIA violation.
This means that for all B  A, c(B) 62 A n fc(A)g. So just like in Case 1, u(c(A)) > u(a)
8 a 2 Anfc(A)g, and f(a;A;X;UB) = f(a0;A;X;UB) 8 a;a0 2 A and B with which an IIA
violation is associated. Hence, f(c(A);A;X;Uc) > f(a;A;X;Uc) 8 a 2 A.
Case 2b: There is B  A with c(B) = a such that B caused an IIA violation. Consider




25f(c(A);A;X;UB) > f(a;A;X;UB) 8 a 2 A, or f(a;A;X;UB) = f(a0;A;X;UB) 8 a;a0 2 A.
But then repeated application of P3 implies that f(c(A);A;X;Uj) > f(a;A;X;Uj) 8 a 2 A.
By construction, f(c(A);A;X;Uc) > f(a;A;X;Uc) 8 a 2 A.
Case 3: There exist at least two elements in A that have each been chosen in some superset.
First, note that one of those elements must be c(A), otherwise A would have caused an IIA
violation. Let fbigi be the set of elements other than c(A) such that bi 2 A and bi = c(Bi)
for some Bi  A. Drop any bi's such that Bi  Bm for some m and call the remaining set
fbjg. Because A did not cause an IIA violation and (2) holds in this case, it must be that
for each bj there is A0
j such that A  A0
j  Bj and c(A0
j) 2 A. Because Bj does not contain
any Bk, we know c(A0
j) = c(A). For each j there may be multiple such A0
j's; consider only
the maximal A0
j with respect to the minimal Bj. Now by maximality, for any A00 such that
A0
j  A00  Bj, c(A00) 62 A. If there is A00 such that c(A00) 2 A0
j, then c(A00) 6= c(A), by
maximality of A0
j. If (2) holds for A0
j then A0
j causes an IIA violation with respect to the
rst such A00; if (2) does not hold for A0
j then Bj cannot be an IIA violation and the set of
smallest supersets containing A0
j whose choice is in A0
j and causes a violation, all have choice
equal to c(A). If for every A00 it is the case that c(A00) 62 A0
j, then once again A0
j either (2)
holds and A0
j causes an IIA violation with respect to B, or (2) does not hold, Bj cannot be
an IIA violation, and the set of smallest supersets containing A0
j whose choice is in A0
j and
causes a violation, all have choice equal to c(A). Either way, we added members to ensure
the choice c(A) for every A0
j. This means that a should be the choice from A unless for some
set B0 between some A0
j and A we have c(B0) 2 Anfag and members were added. But such
a set cannot exist by minimality of the Bj's.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let X = fa;b;cg and take any f 2 F. For compactness, we use the notation x1 =
f(a;fa;b;cg;X;U) f(b;fa;b;cg;X;U); x2 = f(b;fa;b;cg;X;U) f(c;fa;b;cg;X;U), x3 =
f(a;fa;cg;X;U)   f(c;fa;cg;X;U), x4 = f(b;fb;cg;X;U)   f(c;fb;cg;X;U); and x5 =
f(a;fa;bg;X;U)   f(b;fa;bg;X;U):
Lemma 1. If x3 6= x4 + x5, and if any one of the three equations 2x1 + x2   x3   x5 = 0,
x1 + 2x2   x3   x4 = 0, or x1   x2 + x4   x5 = 0 fails, then the aggregator is triple-solvable
(with kf at most 2 + 3jUj).
Proof. The rst column in the table lists the aggregate values for the group U. But by
neutrality, we know that if we can generate the values in column 1, we can also generate the
26values in the 2nd column using the permutation (bc)(a) over the alternatives, generate the
values in the 3rd column using the permutation (ab)(c) over the alternatives, and so on. By
using prole equivalence to evaluate each of the values f  u and f  u0 each generated by
a single member u and u0, with the rankings given in the 6th and 7th headers, respectively,
we can also generate the values in those respective columns.
1 : U 2 : (bc)(a) 3 : (ab)(c) 4 : (abc) 5 : (acb) 6 : a  b  c 7 : a  b  c
x1 x1 + x2  x1 x2  x1   x2 0 x1
x2  x2 x1 + x2  x1   x2 x1 x1 0
x3 x5 x4  x5  x4 x1 x1
x4  x4 x3  x3 x5 x1 0
x5 x3  x5 x4  x3 0 x1
Then, determinants of three possible 5  5 matrices, each composed of ve of the columns
above, may be calculated to obtain:
Det(1j3j5j6j7) = x2
1(x1 + 2x2   x3   x4)(2x1 + x2   x3   x5)(x3   x4   x5);
Det(1j2j5j6j7) = x2
1(2x1 + x2   x3   x5)(x3   x4   x5)(x1   x2 + x4   x5);
Det(2j3j4j6j7) =  x2
1(x1 + 2x2   x3   x4)(x3   x4   x5)(x1   x2 + x4   x5):
To prove the result, it suces to show that there exists U such that dening x1;x2;:::;x5
as above, one of the determinants above must be nonzero. If one of those determinants is
nonzero, then we have nd a vector (c1;c2;c3;c4;c5) such that the nonsingular matrix times
(c1;c2;c3;c4;c5) is equal to (0;0;0;0;) for some  6= 0. Using scaling, each ci can be pulled
in so that the U corresponding to the i-th column is multiplied by ci. The resulting group is
a triple-basis (and therefore we can get triple solvability through scaling that triple-basis).
The proof is completed in light of the linear dependence of the equations 2x1 +x2  x3  
x5 = 0, x1 + 2x2   x3   x4 = 0, and x1   x2 + x4   x5 = 0: if any one of these fails, there
must be a second which fails too.
Lemma 2. Suppose there exists U 2 U(fa;b;cg) such that x3 6= x4+x5 and fU rationalizes
choice where the worst element in the transitive pairwise ranking is best in the triple. Then
either 2x1 + x2 6= x3 + x5 or x1 + 2x2 6= x3 + x4.14
14The above is also true for one type of second-best choice from the triple: a P b P c on the pairs,
and b T c T a on the triple. If there is U such that f  U rationalizes this behavior, then x3;x4;x5 > 0
and x1  0, x2 > 0. Observe that 2x1 + x2 < 0 since this is fa(U)   fb(U) + fa(U)   fc(U). Therefore,
27Proof. By neutrality and symmetry of the condition x3   x4   x5 6= 0, there are two types
of choice behaviors we must examine to prove the result:
Case 1: a P b P c on the pairs, and c T b T a on the triple. That is, x3;x4;x5 > 0,
with x1  0 and x2 < 0. But then 2x1 + x2 6= x3 + x5, since the LHS is negative and the
RHS is positive.
Case 2: a P b P c on the pairs, and c T a T b on the triple. That is, x3;x4;x5 > 0,
with x1  0, x2 < 0. If we can nd U such that f U rationalizes this behavior, then observe
that x1 + 2x2 is negative. Hence x1 + 2x2 6= x3 + x4 because the RHS is positive.
Say that f 2 F is non-degenerate if for some utility function u on X = fa;b;cg, we
have x3 6= x4 + x5 and 2x1 + x2 6= x3 + x5 using U = fug. We formally establish that for
any xed scaling function () the property that an additive, neutral and scale-invariant
aggregator f 2 F is not degenerate holds generically. In order to dene a topology on F,
we transform the latter set of aggregators to a convenient representation. Note that for a
xed scaling function, specifying the aggregated utilities of n alternatives for members in the
n-dimensional simplex determines the aggregated utilities of n alternatives for all possible
members over n alternatives, since any member is a scalar multiple of exactly one member
from the simplex. Hence, with respect to a grand set of alternatives with three elements,
there is a natural bijection  between additive and scale-invariant aggregators, and the set
of pairs of operators

 = (O1;O2jO1 : 2 ! R
2;O2 : 3 ! R
3);
where O1 determines how a member's utilities get aggregated in pairs, and O2 determines
how a member's utilities get aggregated in the triple. Dene metric d on 
 such that the
distance between (O1;O2) and (O0
1;O0
2) is dened as maxi=1;2 supx2Ri jOi(x)   O0
i(x)j.
Lemma 3. Given the topology induced by d, the pairs of operators in 
 that are associated
with non-degenerate aggregators in F is open and dense relative to 
.
Proof. For ease of exposition, let
 
l
1(f;v) = f(a;fa;cg;v)   f(c;fa;cg;v);
 
l
2(f;v) = f(a;fa;bg;v)   f(b;fa;bg;v) + f(b;fb;cg;v)   f(c;fb;cg;v);
2x1 + x2 6= x3 + x5, as the RHS is positive.
28 
l
2(f;v) = f(a;fa;b;cg;v)   f(b;fa;b;cg;v)] + [f(a;fa;b;cg;v)   f(c;fa;b;cg;v);
 
l
2(f;v) = [f(a;fa;bg;v)   f(b;fa;bg;v)] + [f(a;fa;cg;v)   f(c;fa;cg;v)];
for every v 2 F. Note that  
j
i(v) stands for side j of the equation in condition i in the
denition of a degenerate aggregator, given aggregator f and a member v.
1. Openness. Suppose that for aggregator f there is a member u over a triple such that
neither of the equalities in the denition of a degenerate aggregator hold with equality. Note
that u cannot be an indierent member. Let "i =  l
i(f;v)    r
i(f;v) for i 2 f1;2g, and let
" = max(j"1j;j"2j). Next, for every i;j 2 fa;b;cg such that i 6= j, let ij be such that
ij(u(i);u(j)) 2 2. Note that the terms ij are uniquely dened. Similarly, let abc be
such that abc(u(a);u(b);u(c)) 2 3. Let  = max(jabj;jacj;jbcj;jabcj). Since u is not an
indierent member,  > 0. Then for  < "
8 it holds that  l
i(f0;v) 6=  r
i(f0;v) for i 2 f1;2g
for every f0 such that j(f)   (f0)j < , since each term given f0 in the above inequalities
can dier from the corresponding term given f by at most "
8.
2. Denseness. Let  > 0. Consider a member u 2 3 over fa;b;cg such that u(a) > u(b) >
u(c). For every i;j 2 fa;b;cg such that i 6= j, let ij be such that ij(u(i);u(j)) 2 2. Let
 = max(jabj;jacj;jbcj). If for an aggregator f neither of the equalities in the denition
of a degenerate aggregator hold, then the aggregator is by denition non-degenerate, hence
there is trivially a point in the -neighborhood of (f) that corresponds to a non-degenerate
aggregator. Otherwise let " 2 (0; 
) be such that " 6= j l
i(f;v)    r
i(f;v)j for i 2 f1;2g.
Consider now any f0 2 F for which (i) for triples, f0 is equivalent to f; and (ii) for a
pair fx;yg, given any utility function v over fx;yg for which v(x)  v(y), f0(x;fx;yg;v) =
f(x;fx;yg;v) and f0(y;fx;yg;v) = f(y;fx;yg;v) if v(x) v(y) < u(a) u(c), but f0(x;fx;yg;v) =
f(x;fx;yg;v)+" and f0(y;fx;yg;v) = f(y;fx;yg;v) if v(x) v(y)  u(a) u(c). In words,
with respect to members for which the utility dierence between the elements of the pair is
at least u(a) u(c) the aggregated utility is " > 0 higher than what f yields for the preferred
alternative (while it is the same for the other alternative) - otherwise f0 is equivalent to f. By









2(f;v) + ": Then " 6= j l
i(f;v)    r
i(f;v)j for i 2 f1;2g
implies that  l
i(f0;v) 6=  r
i(f0;v) for i 2 f1;2g. Hence, f0 is non-degenerate.
Theorem 1 then follows from Theorem 2, Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
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32Supplementary Appendices, Not for Publication
This document contains supplementary appendices to \Rationalizing Choice with
Multi-Self Models" by Ambrus and Rozen. The main paper is referenced through-
out as AR.
A Non-anonymous aggregators
We extend our framework to incorporate aggregators that treat dierent group members
in a non-anonymous manner, and show how our main result extends to this more general
class of aggregators. The description of a member is extended by an abstract type, and
the denition of an aggregator is extended to include a set of possible types. The abstract
set of types could include, for example, \long-run" and \short-run" selves, or selves caring
about dierent types of objectives, such as the \parental" and \work" selves mentioned in
Section 1.
An aggregator F = (T;f) species a set of possible types T and a function f that
species the aggregate utility for every alternative a in every choice set A, given any (nite)
grand set of alternatives X and any collection of selves S dened over X and T. A single
member s is given by a pair (u;t). For each positive integer n, we denote by Sn(X;T) the
set of all collections of members (unordered lists) dened with respect to X and T, and let
S(X;T) = [1
n=1Sn(X;T). We will denote a particular collection of members by S, and refer
to the members in the group as s1;:::;sn. To denote the number of members in S, we use
the notation jSj or simply n when no confusion would arise.
This extension allows us to consider asymmetric aggregators.
Example 1 (Asymmetric contextual concavity model). Interpret each member as corre-
sponding to a product attribute, for which the preference belongs to a certain type. The class
of preferences is parametrized by a concavity index. The contextual concavity aggregator in









where  : T ! R gives the concavity parameter for a type-t member.
33Since collections of selves are still dened as unordered lists, by construction aggregators
in this framework treat selves of the same type symmetrically. Hence, asymmetries can enter
only through dierent specied types. In particular, the framework constructed in the main
text can be viewed as a special case of the extended framework proposed above, when the
set of possible types is a singleton. Axioms P1-P6 can be generalized in a straightforward
manner to the extended setting. Since the only changes required in the generalization are
notational (all statements applying previously to selves now apply to the extended notion of
a member), we omit restating the axioms in the extended framework. The main theorem is
unchanged. The denition of a triple-basis is unchanged, as is the theorem:
Theorem 3. Suppose f satises P1-P6 and is triple-solvable with kf selves. Then, using n
selves, f can rationalize any choice function c, dened on any nite grand set of alternatives
X, that exhibits at most n 1
kf IIA violations.
Consider a dierent type of example.
Example 2 (Costly self-control aggregators). Fudenberg and Levine (2006) propose a dual-
self impulse control model with a long-run self exerting costly self-control over a short-run
self. The reduced-form model they derive has an analogous representation in our framework,
with two selves: the long-run self, with utility given by ulr (the expected present value of
the utility stream induced by the choice in the present), and the short-run self, with utility
function usr (the present period consumption utility).15 Using our terminology, the reduced
form representation of their model assigns to alternative a the aggregate utility ulr(a) C(a),
where term C(a) depends on the attainable utility levels for the short-run self and is labeled as
the cost of self-control. For example, using Fudenberg and Levine (2006)'s parametrization,
C(a) = [max
a02A
usr(a0)   usr(a)] .
One way to generalize this aggregator to any number of selves would be to introduce
multiple short-term temptations, represented by selves usr
1 ;:::;usr












Here, the long-run self is treated dierently than the rest.
15The long-run self's utility is equal to the short-run self's utility plus the expected continuation value
induced by the choice. If the latter can take any value, then ulr is not restricted by the short-run utility usr.
If continuation values cannot be arbitrary (for example they have to be nonnegative) then usr restricts the
possible values of ulr, hence U has a restricted domain. In Fudenberg and Levine (2006) the utility functions
also depend on a state variable y. Here we suppress this variable, instead make the choice set explicit.
34As in the above generalization of Fudenberg and Levine (2006), it may be the case that
a multi-self model places restrictions on how many selves of each type can appear. If types
are restricted, the description of the model should also include a set of possible collections of
types C, given by a subset of the set of all possible unordered n-long lists of elements of T,
for every n 2 Z+. The aggregator f need only specify the aggregate utility arising for any
collection of selves S dened over X and T for which the implied collection of types is in C.
Our results can be extended in a variety of ways to accommodate such restrictions.
The most straightforward one imposes an assumption on the set C (which is satised in
Example 2). Assume the existence of a type t and a collection of types b T such that appending
any number of t-types to b T results in a collection of types in C. In the generalized costly
self-control aggregator above, the short-run type being t and the singleton set of a long-run
type as b T satisfy this requirement. Let T n
t denote the collection of n t-types. An aggregator
f is expandable with t 2 T from b T 2 C if (b T;T n
t ) 2 C for every n 2 Z+. For an aggregator
that is expandable with t from b T we can dene triple-solvability with k type-t selves from b T
as the existence of a collection of selves consisting of jb Tj exactly indierent selves over the
triple whose type-composition is as in b T and k -indierent selves of type t, such that the
above collection of types constitutes a triple-basis for every  > 0.
Given the above denitions, the following result is obtained.
Theorem 4. Suppose f is triple-solvable with k type-t selves from b T. Then, using n selves,
f can rationalize any choice function c, dened on any nite grand set of alternatives X,
that exhibits at most
n 1 jb Tj
k IIA violations.
Because the aggregation term for a short-run self is the negative of the symmetric contex-
tual concavity aggregation, it is immediate that the generalized costly self-control aggregator
dened above is triple-solvable according to the extended denition.
B Examples rationalizing common choice procedures
Example 3 (The Median Procedure). The median procedure is a simple choice rule dened
in Kalai et al. (2002). There is a strict ordering  dened over elements of X, and the DM
always chooses the median element of each A  X according to  (choosing the right-hand
side element among the medians from choice sets with even number of alternatives).













u(a0) is the median element of the set fu(a0)ga02A, with the convention that in
sets with an even number of distinct utility levels, the median is the smaller of the two
median utility levels. The geometric aggregation implies that in case of selves having exactly
the opposite preferences, the aggregated utility of an alternative from a given choice set is
maximized when it is closest to the median element of the utility levels from the choice set.
Indeed, we claim that with the above aggregator, two selves can be used to rationalize the
median procedure. Let a1;a2;:::;aN stand for the increasing ordering of alternatives in X
according to , and dene u1(ai) = i + " and u2(ai) = N + 1   i for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
It is easy to see that for small enough " > 0 it is indeed one of the median elements of









u2(a0) is constant across all elements of X, and the aggregated
utility is dened to be the product of the two terms.
This rationalization is relatively simple and intuitive: the above selves are dened such
that the DM is torn between two motivations, one in line with ordering , and one going
in exactly the opposite direction. Moreover, the geometric aggregation of these preferences
drives the DM to choose the most central element of any choice set.
There are many variants of the above aggregator that given two selves with diametrically
opposed interests do not select exactly the median from every choice set, but have a tendency
to induce the choice of a centrally located element from any choice set. In general, if f is
menu-dependent and aggregates the utilities of selves through a concave function, the choice
induced by f exhibits a compromise eect or extremeness aversion, as in the experiments
of Simonson (1989): given two opposing motivations, an alternative is more likely to be
selected the more centrally it is located. If, on the other hand, f is menu-dependent and
convex, then it can give rise to a polarization eect, as in the experiments of Simonson and
Tversky (1992): the induced choice is likely to be in one of the extremes of the choice set.
Hence, our model can be used to reinterpret experimental choice data in dierent contexts,
in terms of properties of the aggregator function.
Another simple procedure Kalai et al. (2002) study is Sen (1993)'s second-best procedure.
36Example 4 (Choosing the second best). Consider the following procedure: there is some
strict ordering  dened over elements of X, and the DM always chooses the second best
element of any choice set, according to . We will show that there is an aggregator that can
rationalize the choice function given by the above procedure no matter how large X is, using
only two selves. For any self u on X, and any A  X, let l(u;A) be the lowest utility level





u(b) if u(a) = l(u;A)
u(a) otherwise.
That is, g penalizes the worst elements of a given choice set, by an amount that corre-
sponds to the best attainable utility in X. Dene now the following aggregator: for any
U = fu1;:::;ung 2 U(X), let f(a;A;X;U) =
n P
i=1
g(a;A;X;ui). That is, f is a utilitarian
aggregation, with large disutility associated with alternatives that are worst for some selves in
the choice set. We claim that the following two selves rationalize the second-best procedure
with f. Let a1;a2;:::;aN stand for the increasing ordering of alternatives in X according
to , and dene u1(aj) = j and u2(aj) = N +
N+1 j
2N for all j 2 f1;:::;Ng. Note that
the incremental utilities of u1 when choosing a higher -ranked element are larger than the
incremental disutilities of u2. Hence this self determines the preference ordering implied by
the aggregated utility, with the exception of the choice between the best alternative and the
second-best alternative for u1 in the choice set. This is because the best alternative for u1 is
the worst one for u2, and the extra disutility associated with this worst choice for u2 over-
comes the incremental utility for u1. This rationalization has the simple interpretation of a
conict between a greedy self and an altruistic self.
In contrast, Kalai et al. (2002) show that in their framework, in which exactly one self
is responsible for any decision, as the size of X increases, the number of selves required to
rationalize either of the above procedures goes to innity. Kalai et al. (2002) also discuss the
idea that when multiple rationalizations are behavior, one with the minimal number of selves
is most appealing. While dictator-type aggregators do not provide an intuitively appealing
explanation for the median procedure, aggregators in our framework can rationalize the
above procedures in simple and intuitive ways.
Note that the aggregators and selves in these examples together rationalize very specic
types of behavior. However, a given aggregator might act dierently on a dierent collection
of selves. For example, if the two selves did not have exactly opposing preferences in the
37example rationalizing the median procedure, the aggregator might not choose a centrally
located alternative in every choice set. Hence AR studies the set of behaviors that an
aggregator can rationalize (with dierent possible selves).
C Approximate triple-solvability
For some aggregators a tighter upper bound can be given for the minimum group size needed
to rationalize a choice function, by weakening the triple-solvability requirement. It suces
for triple-solvability to hold only approximately, which can yield a triple-basis with a smaller
group size. For ease of exposition, we state this property for additively separable aggregators.
Denition 4. We say ^ U 2 U(fa;b;cg) is a (;")-approximate triple-basis for f with respect
to fa;b;cg if f(a;fa;bg;fa;b;cg; ^ U) = f(b;fa;bg;fa;b;cg; ^ U) +  and jf(x;A;fa;b;cg; ^ U)  
f(y;A;fa;b;cg; ^ U)j < " for all other A  fa;b;cg and x;y 2 A.
That is, a group U is a (;")-approximate triple basis for f if given choice set fa;bg the
aggregated utility of U for a is exactly  higher than the aggregated utility of b, while U is
"-indierent among all alternatives given every other choice set.
We say that an aggregator f is approximately triple-solvable with k members if there is
 > 0 such that exists a (;")-approximate triple-basis with k members for every  <  and
" > 0. That is, for approximate triple-solvability we do not require that the group in the
triple basis is exactly indierent between all elements in choice sets other than fa;bg, only
that they can be arbitrarily close to being indierent. Theorem 2 can then be modied as
follows.
Theorem 5. Suppose f satises P1-P6 and P9, and is approximately triple-solvable with kf
members. Then, for any nite set of alternatives X, and any choice function c : P(X) ! X
that exhibits at most n 1
kf IIA-violations, f can rationalize c with n members.
Proof. The only dierence compared to the proof of Theorem 2 is in the construction of the
rationalizing group. Recall the denition of (Ij)j=1;:::;j from the proof of Theorem 2. Let
1 2 (0;). Dene iteratively j for j 2 f2;:::;j + 1g such that j 2 (0;
j 1
IIA(c)+1). Dene
a member uX such that uX is j+1-indierent and the preference ordering of the self is







38Finally, let " 2 (0; 
jXj). Then for every j 2 f1;:::;j) and A 2 Ij construct a group
UA 2 U(X) the following way: take a (j;")-approximate triple-basis U, and dene UA by
dening, for each ui 2 U, a member uA





> > > <
> > > :
ui(a) x = c(A)
ui(b) x 2 A n fc(A)g
ui(c) x 2 X n A:
Proving the group consisting of uX and UA for each A 2
j S
j=1
Ij rationalizes c is analogous to
the proof in Theorem 2.
D Relaxing P6
Our main results can be extended to aggregators violating P6, that is, to aggregators that
depend in a nontrivial way on alternatives unavailable in a given choice set. However, the
appropriate denition of triple-solvability is more complicated.
The main complication arising in the absence of P6 is that triple-solvability needs to be
dened on a general X, as opposed to just a triple fa;b;cg. It is convenient to introduce the
following notation: for any triple fa;b;cg, any basic set of alternatives X  fa;b;cg, and any
self u dened on fa;b;cg, dene the set E(u;X) = fb u : X ! fu(a);u(b);u(c)gjb u(x) = u(x)
8 x 2 fa;b;cgg. In words, E(u;X) is the set of extensions of u from fa;b;cg to X for
which each element in X=fa;b;cg receives the same utility as either a or b or c. Similarly,
for any U = (u1;:::;um) 2 U(fa;b;cg), let E(U;X) = f(b u1;:::;b um)jb ui 2 E(ui;X) for all
i 2 f1;:::;mgg.
Denition 5. We say U 2 U(fa;b;cg) is a universal triple-basis for f if for any X 
fa;b;cg the following holds: for all ^ U 2 E(U;X), f(a;fa;bg;X; ^ U) > f(b;fa;bg;X; ^ U); and
f(;A;X; ^ U) is constant for all other A  fa;b;cg.
A universal triple-basis solves the triple fa;b;cg whenever the utilities of unattainable
elements don't dier from utilities of elements in fa;b;cg, for all members in the triple-basis.
An aggregator f is universally triple-solvable if the following condition is satised.
39Condition (Universal triple-solvability of f) There exists a triple fa;b;cg and k 2 Z+
such that for every  > 0 there is a -indierent U 2 Uk(fa;b;cg) constituting a universal
triple-basis for f with respect to fa;b;cg.
It is easy to see that for aggregators satisfying P6, universal triple-solvability is equivalent
to triple-solvability. If f satisfying P1-P5 is universally triple-solvable with k members, then
the same construction can be applied as in the proof of Theorem 2 to obtain an analogous
lower bound on the set of choice functions that f can rationalize with a given group size.
The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 and hence omitted.
Theorem 6. Suppose f satises P1-P5 and is universally triple-solvable wrt to X with kf
members. Then, using n group members, f can rationalize any choice function, on any grand
set of alternatives X, that exhibits at most n 1
kf IIA-violations.
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